Abstract
Thinking plays an essential role in one's (internal) life, and it is not for nothing that the western philosophy grounded on Descartes (1637 Descartes ( /1996 1641 /2008 famous statement: "I think, therefore I am" (Je pense donc je suis). We are thinking creatures: that is to say, as long as we are awake there is something going on inside our heads. Furthermore, we are reflective creatures. Reflection, or introspection, is an exclusively human ability; it is what makes us (humans) special (for introduction see: (Schwitzgebe, 2010) ). In fact, the capability to reflect is what makes our consciousness distinctive, and, accordingly, it is one of the most important of all human features.
Thoughts do not exist in open spaces; rather, they exist, at least allegedly, "inside our heads", within our brains (the brain is obviously part of our body). Thoughts are inside one's body as well as "for the sake" of the body, and, fundamentally, thoughts can be looked as rooted in one's body (Thompson & Varela, 2001; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) . In altered states of consciousness (ASC), the characteristics of human thought may be dramatically changed (Ludwig, Altered states of consciousness, 1966; Vaitl, et al., 2005; James, 1974; Tart, 1969 ; Shanon, The Antipodes of the Mind, 2002) . Many studies have shown that after experiencing ASC, humans may be exposed to a whole new body of knowledge (e.g., (Becker, 2004; James, 1974; Rouget, 1985; Shanon, 2002; Tart, 1969) . The way that they see the world may be reconstructed and reshaped. Most notably, they may experience a sense of being cut off from their body. There is a wide agreement that sensory deprivation can (not necessarily) lead to ASC (Glicksohn, Altered sensory environments, altered states of consciousness and altered-state cognition, 1993; Zubek, 1969; Vaitl, et al., 2005) .
In the present paper a sense of being cut off from one's body was explored in the hope of unveiling mechanisms that underlie regular human thought. Specifically, thought processes among former prisoners of war (POWs) who reported being profoundly severed from their own bodies during isolation in captivity were explored.
Methods
We sought to explore ASC via extensive accounts provided by Israeli POWs who underwent extreme experiences during war captivity. This approach has been endorsed by major scholars who have suggested studying extreme experiences (pathological cases) when aiming to explore unique psychological processes: (Sacks, 1985; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998; Metzinger, 2008; Gallagher, 2005; Frith & Gallagher, 2002) . It was our a-priori assumption that the accounts of individuals undergoing war captivity would provide us with a rather unique opportunity to learn more about core components characterizing ASC, including changes in one's sense of self and one's sense of body.
We aimed to obtain detailed and comprehensive descriptions of ASC. To this end, we have used a phenomenological method (Lutz, 2007; Thompson & Varela, 2001; Varela & Shear, 1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Husserl, 1900 Husserl, /1970 , to be precise, we use interviewing technique suggested by Petitmengin (see (2006; ). The technique was designed to enable a close focus on the "how", in addition to the "what", to penetrate boundaries of "words" and to break through walls of "stories" aiming to capture the primary experience (Legrand, 2006; Zahavi, 2002; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2005 ). We did not look only at "facts" but rather at the unknown, or yet to be known. All interviews were based on a questionnaire constructed in advance by one of the authors (YA). Yet, interviews were open and relatively flexible. We utilized Petitmengin's technique (2006; , which attempts to reach the "how", and to go beyond the "what", by breaking through the walls of "stories" (narrative-self) and "words" into primary experiences which are pre-reflective self-consciousness. During the interviews subjects are often discover new details about their experiences while both the interviewer and the interviewee are seeking the right path into the primary experiences.
Fifteen Israeli ex-prisoners were interviewed face to face for a period of between one and four hours each. Ages of subjects ranged from 59 to 71 years old. All interviews were audio taped and transcribed. Military roles varied from being combat pilots to infantry soldier. Subjects had been held in captivity in Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon. Periods of isolation ranged from 36 days to three and a half years. With the exception of one interviewee, the native language of the interviewees was Hebrew. 
Results and Discussion

State of consciousness in deep isolation
(G.); "You don't sleep in captivity, I almost didn't know what sleep was" (M).
In solitary confinement, where there is very little or no stimulation and the POW has no interaction with the outside world, the internal world becomes the only thing the captive possesses and the shift from wakefulness to sleep becomes unclear. Normally, there is a clear distinction between being asleep and awake. When we are sleeping, time comes to a halt; when we are awake, time is so obvious that it is taken for granted and becomes transparent (Zakay, 1998) . As we will see, a situation in which the subject cannot effectively distinguish whether he is sleeping and dreaming reality, or perhaps awake and in deep hallucinations is critical in order to learn about the character of thought. As captives emphasize, in a state of captivity they do not have the ability to qualitatively distinguish between the states of sleep, wakefulness, or hallucination: 
Sense of body "You are very busy with caring for yourself, for your wounds, with your body" (N.); The central experience in captivity, one is physically coping, which is very difficult, blows, thirst, tiredness. It is seared very deeply into your head and doesn't leave. And you almost don't have anything that, in its intensity, can deal with the physical difficulty" (E.).
Unfortunately, in order to survive in this extreme situation, the captive has cut himself off from his own body. 
The nature of thought in captivity
The accounts of the POWs reflect an inherent fear of "emptiness"; that is, a fear that no thoughts will be created in their mind: However, in the absence of body, which is the rational object of consciousness (Damásio, 1999; Gallagher, 2005; Spinoza, 1677 Spinoza, /2008 , it is difficult for the captive to distinguish between reality, hallucination, and (controlled) imagination. One of the most important insights arising from the interviews refers to the role of imagination during isolation. In a world without stimulation, imagination plays a decisive role in conjunction with the emptiness of thought. However, unlike in normal states of consciousness in daily life, the captive has an existential need to distinguish between dream and imagination, as he is not able to comprehend reality as something to be taken for granted ( In summary, during isolation, the captive often loses his body in terms of how people usually sense their body, e.g., as it is my body (Zahavi, 2002; Legrand, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Heidegger, 1996; Gallagher & Zahavi, Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness, 2005 , and consequently, the character of the captive's thought changes.
The sense of time in captivity
The time dimension plays a key role in captivity (consistent with (Wittmann, 1999) ):
I learned that the most important thing was time…the time is a dimension which is very very very significant"(P.); One of the great problems in captivity is how to cope with the dimension of time. Each day that passes, you become farther away from life…The problem of time is marginal but significant, see, I didn't how long it would continue"(L.).
POWs' accounts suggest that sense of time and sense of body may be tightly interrelated:
"I didn't have any organization of time, only body time. My body time was made up of needs, when I began to be thirsty, when I began to be hungry and the other needs. My time was my body rhythm. Hunger told me that time had passed" (D.).
The ability to "pass time" and to develop a daily routine and a "time framework" seems to be crucial for captives' survival:
"I tried to build a kind of pretty permanent daily routine for myself" (S.); "I tried to organize a daily routine" (Y.) Despite, or, more accurately, due to the fact that the lack of sense of time as an "objective"/"Newtonian" dimension is missing, captives often try to develop a general time framework, aiming to consciously experience passage of time and to reduce suffering from isolation: "Every day a ritual, to mark a line on the wall, that another day has passed" (E.); But also: "You constantly give yourself a time target of…until then -in November I said to myself, until December, no more than that. After that, until Chanukah. If 
you are normal and don't become depressed, so you set a new target each time the date comes closer"(E.)
Captives' accounts suggest that disintegration of the body, the reduced ability to experience a perceived body (from within), and the deficient capacity to grasp time (or, more correctly, to exist in the dimension of time -not to sense it but to exist in it as an objective dimension) are all tightly related, and represent the core components of consciousness, which produce the feeling of being-in-the-world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962 P. has difficulty describing his experience, yet the connection between the depth of thought and the mental process (which may perfectly go along with some cognitive models, i.e., information processing, , (Glicksohn, 2001) ), and the sense of passing time is clear to him. It is the sense that deeper mental processes continue for longer than usual (which fits well into the principle of cognitive load presented by Zakay (1998) ). P. does not know how much time has really passed and therefore, thinking becomes the point of reference for creating any kind of time which can be measured, and for the sense of time. It seems that when the sense of body is lost, the sense of time becomes anchored (and fixed) in one's thoughts. This is, once again, consistent with Wittman (2009) (Wittmann, 2009 (Wittmann, , p. 1962 .
To sum, captive accounts suggest that the relationships between time and thought may be severely impacted in captivity. First, thought starts to progress independently of the body and of the arrow of time, which the body seemingly brings with it from the outside (the dependence of thought on time from the beginning is a habit rather than a necessity). Then, in isolation, the sense of time stems from thought, not only from the flow of changing thoughts, but also, and especially, from the content of thought. The word "content" may seem vague, however, from a cognitive perspective, we may simply say that "content" is, in fact, information processing (Glicksohn, 2001; Zakay, 1998) . So, the sense of time is reduced to information processing, meaning that the sense of time in essence can be deduced from the cognitive resource consumption needed in order to process information.
Conclusion
While trying to distinguish between imagination and reality, between illusion and dream, between hallucination and truth, the present paper aimed to evaluate the mechanisms of human thought. We found that: (a) in ASC the loss of one's sense of body results in the loss of the sensation of objectivity because the body is not only an object of consciousness but also its rational basis; (b) the perception of time and thought are anchored in the body, so time perceived as an objective dimension (since it always arrives with the body), namely, as if the arrow of time is truly exists; Thus, (c) from the viewpoint of the subject, the arrow of time is a fundamental condition for rational and logical thought; Principally, (d) the previous arguments (b+c) are constitutive and preliminary conditions for an individual to perceive the world in an objective manner; (e) the sense of time (on the scale that goes from totally objective to completely subjective) enables the subject to qualitatively distinguish between hallucination, reality and dream, because, time is at the heart of the structure of thought and it establishes the experience; and, in fact (f) it [time] plays the most critical role in designing thought, consciousness and the human experience.
